# ASU Cards Round 8

## 1NC

### 1

#### A. Our interpretation is that the affirmative should have to instrumentally defend the institutional implementation of a topical plan.

#### B. Violation – the aff doesn’t defend a plan.

#### C. Best for fairness.

#### 1. Plan focus is the only predictable way of affirming the resolution. Philosophical and theoretical concerns certainly play into the ways that policies are made, but the resolution only calls for us to defend and/or question political-institutional implementations of these kinds of concerns.

#### 2. Plan focus is the only way to ensure a fair division of ground. The affirmative has the advantage of trying to solve the most heinous problems of the status quo—without plan focus, debates devolve into whether or not things like racism, sexism, classism, or homophobia are good or bad. While problems are often less contestable, solutions to these problems are—we can debate about whether or not a particular proposal will fix or worsen these problems and proffer our own solutions.

#### 3. Topical version of your aff – you can run an aff that bans practices of indefinite detention. Solves all your offense.

#### 4. Switch side solves all your offense – you can run this argument on the negative. Solves all your impacts and preserves our ground.

#### D. Best for education:

#### 1. Their infatuation to theoretical purity makes political and institutional engagement impossible. Political engagement is always cast against the theoretical purity of abstract philosophizing. This also turns their argument because, despite their radical aspirations, critique smuggles metaphysical distinctions between thinking and acting, purity and impurity, and truth and falsity into the judge’s decisionmaking calculus.

Yar 2k (Majid, Ph.D in the Department of Sociology at Lancaster University, “Arendt's Heideggerianism: Contours of a `Postmetaphysical' Political Theory?,” *Cultural Values*, Volume 4, Issue 1, January, Academic Search Complete)

Similarly, we must consider the consequences that this 'ontological substitution' for the essence of the political has for politics, in terms of what is practically excluded by this rethinking. If the presently available menu of political engagements and projects (be they market or social liberalism, social democracy, communitarianism, Marxism, etc.) are only so many moments of the techno-social completion of an underlying metaphysics, then the fear of 'metaphysical contamination' inhibits any return to recognisable political practices and sincere engagement with the political exigencies of the day. This is what Nancy Fraser has called the problem of 'dirty hands', the suspension of engagement with the existing content of political agendas because of their identification as being in thrall to the violence of metaphysics. Unable to engage in politics as it is, one either [a] sublimates the desire for politics by retreating to an interrogation of the political with respect to its essence (Fraser, 1984, p. 144), or [b] on this basis, seeks 'to breach the inscription of a wholly other politics'. The former suspends politics indefinitely, while the latter implies a new politics, which, on the basis of its reconceived understanding of the political, apparently excludes much of what recognizably belongs to politics today. This latter difficulty is well known from Arendt's case, whose barring of issues of social and economic justice and welfare from the political domain are well known. To offer two examples: [1] in her commentary on the U.S. civil rights movement in the 1950s, she argued that the politically salient factor which needed challenging was only racial legislation and the formal exclusion of African-Americans from the political sphere, not discrimination, social deprivation and disadvantage, etc.(Arendt, 1959, pp. 45-56); [2] Arendt's pronounceraent at a conference in 1972 (put under question by Albrecht Wellmer regarding her distinction of the 'political' and the 'social'), that housing and homelessness were not political issues, that they were external to the political as the sphere of the actualisation of freedom as disclosure; the political is about human self-disclosure in speech and deed, not about the distribution of goods, which belongs to the social realm as an extension of the oikos.[20] The point here is not that Arendt and others are in any sense unconcerned or indifferent about such sufferings, deprivations and inequalities. Rather, it is that such disputes and agendas are identified as belonging to the socio-technical sphere of administration, calculation, instrumentality, the logic of means and ends, subject-object manipulation by a will which turns the world to its purposes, the conceptual rendering of beings in terms of abstract and levelling categories and classes, and so on; they are thereby part and parcel of the metaphysical-technological understanding of Being, which effaces the unique and singular appearance and disclosure of beings, and thereby illegitimate candidates for consideration under the renewed, ontological-existential formulation of the political. To reconceive the political in terms of a departure from its former incarnation as metaphysical politics, means that the revised terms of a properly political discourse cannot accommodate the prosaic yet urgent questions we might typically identify under the rubric of 'policy'. Questions of social and economic justice are made homeless, exiled from the political sphere of disputation and demand in which they were formerly voiced. Indeed, it might be observed that the postmetaphysical formulation of the political is devoid of any content other than the freedom which defines it; it is freedom to appear, to disclose, but not the freedom to do something in particular, in that utilising freedom for achieving some end or other implies a collapse back into will, instrumentality, teleocracy, poeisis, etc. By defining freedom qua disclosedness as the essence of freedom and the sole end of the political, this position skirts dangerously close to advocating politique pour la politique, divesting politics of any other practical and normative ends in the process.[21]

#### 2. The political *is* value to life—it is how originally solipsistic lives become incarnate and real to themselves.

Arendt 1958 [Hannah, *The Human Condition*, pp. 196-199]

The original, prephilosophic Greek remedy for this frailty had been the foundation of the polis. The polis, as it grew out of and remained rooted in the Greek pre-polis experience and estimate of what makes it worthwhile for men to live together (syzen), namely, the "sharing of words and deeds,"26 had a twofold function. First, it was intended to enable men to do permanently, albeit under certain restrictions, what otherwise had been possible only as an extraordinary and infrequent enterprise for which they had to leave their households. The polis was supposed to multiply the occasions to win "immortal fame," that is, to multiply the chances for everybody to distinguish himself, to show in deed and word who he was in his unique distinctness. One, if not the chief, reason for the incredible development of gift and genius in Athens, as well as for the hardly less surprising swift decline of the city-state, was precisely that from beginning to end its foremost aim was to make the extraordinary an ordinary occurrence of everyday life. The second function of the polls, again closely connected with the hazards of action as experienced before its coming into being, was to offer a remedy for the futility of action and speech; for the chances that a deed deserving fame would not be forgotten, that it actually would become "immortal," were not very good. Homer was not only a shining example of the poet's political function, and therefore the "educator of all Hellas"; the very fact that so great an enterprise as the Trojan War could have been forgotten without a poet to immortalize it several hundred years later offered only too good an example of what could happen to human greatness if it had nothing but poets to rely on for its permanence. We are not concerned here with the historical causes for the rise of the Greek city-state; what the Greeks themselves thought of it and its ralson d'etre, they have made unmistakably clear. The polis-—if we trust the famous words of Pericles in the Funeral Oration—gives a guaranty that those who forced every sea and land to become the scene of their daring will not remain without witness and will need neither Homer nor anyone else who knows how to turn words to praise them; without assistance from others, those who acted will be able to establish together the everlasting remembrance of their good and bad deeds, to inspire admiration in the present and in future ages.27 In other words, men's life together in the form of the polis seemed to assure that the most futile of human activities, action and speech, and the least tangible and most ephemeral of man-made "products," the deeds and stories which are their outcome, would become imperishable. The organization of the polis, physically secured by the wall around the city and physiognomically guaranteed by its laws—lest the succeeding generations change its identity beyond recognition is a kind of organized remembrance. It assures the mortal actor that his passing existence and fleeting greatness will never lack the reality that comes from being seen, being heard, and, generally, appearing before an audience of fellow men, who outside the polis could attend only the short duration of the performance and therefore needed Homer and "others of his craft" in order to be presented to those who were not there. According to this self-interpretation, the political realm rises directly out of acting together, the "sharing of words and deeds." Thus action not only has the most intimate relationship to the public part of the world common to us all, but is the one activity which constitutes it. It is as though the wall of the polis and the boundaries of the law were drawn around an already existing public space which, however, without such stabilizing protection could not endure, could not survive the moment of action and speech itself. Not historically, of course, but speaking metaphorically and theoretically, it is as though the men who returned from the Trojan War had wished to make permanent the space of action which had arisen from their deeds and sufferings, to prevent its perishing with their dispersal and return to their isolated homesteads. The polis, properly speaking, is not the city-state in its physical location; it is the organization of the people as it arises out of acting and speaking together, and its true space lies between people living together for this purpose, no matter where they happen to be. "Wherever you go, you will be a polis": these famous words became not merely the watchword of Greek colonization, they expressed the conviction that action and speech create a space between the participants which can find its proper location almost any time and anywhere. It is the space of appearance in the widest sense of the word, namely, the space where I appear to others as others appear to me, where men exist not merely like other living or inanimate things but make their appearance explicitly. This space does not always exist, and although all men are capable of deed and word, most of them—like the slave, the foreigner, and the barbarian in antiquity, like the laborer or craftsman prior to the modern age, the jobholder or businessman in our world—do not live in it. No man, moreover, can live in it all the time. To be deprived of it means to be deprived of reality, which, humanly and politically speaking, is the same as appearance. To men the reality of the world is guaranteed by the presence of others, by its appearing to all; "for what appears to all, this we call Being,"28 and whatever lacks this appearance comes and passes away like a dream, intimately and exclusively our own but without reality.29

#### 3. No solvency for their critique without institutional focus. We must try to change policy in order to change the world—the concentration of power in the hands of political elites is inevitable, so we must work within that system to check oppression and violence.

Themba-Nixon 2k [Makani, Executive Director of the Praxis Project, *Colorlines* 3.2, pg. 12]

The flourish and passion with which she made the distinction said everything. Policy is for wonks, sell-out politicians, and ivory-tower eggheads. Organizing is what real, grassroots people do. Common as it may be, this distinction doesn't bear out in the real world. Policy is more than law. It is any written agreement (formal or informal) that specifies how an institution, governing body, or community will address shared problems or attain shared goals. It spells out the terms and the consequences of these agreements and is the codification of the body's values-as represented by those present in the policymaking process. Given who's usually present, most policies reflect the political agenda of powerful elites. Yet, policy can be a force for change-especially when we bring our base and community organizing into the process. In essence, policies are the codification of power relationships and resource allocation. Policies are the rules of the world we live in. Changing the world means changing the rules. So, if organizing is about changing the rules and building power, how can organizing be separated from policies? Can we really speak truth to power, fight the right, stop corporate abuses, or win racial justice without contesting the rules and the rulers, the policies and the policymakers? The answer is no-and double no for people of color. Today, racism subtly dominates nearly every aspect of policymaking. From ballot propositions to city funding priorities, policy is increasingly about the control, de-funding, and disfranchisement of communities of color. What Do We Stand For? Take the public conversation about welfare reform, for example. Most of us know it isn't really about putting people to work. The right's message was framed around racial stereotypes of lazy, cheating "welfare queens" whose poverty was "cultural." But the new welfare policy was about moving billions of dollars in individual cash payments and direct services from welfare recipients to other, more powerful, social actors. Many of us were too busy to tune into the welfare policy drama in Washington, only to find it washed up right on our doorsteps. Our members are suffering from workfare policies, new regulations, and cutoffs. Families who were barely getting by under the old rules are being pushed over the edge by the new policies. Policy doesn't get more relevant than this. And so we got involved in policy-as defense. Yet we have to do more than block their punches. We have to start the fight with initiatives of our own. Those who do are finding offense a bit more fun than defense alone. Living wage ordinances, youth development initiatives, even gun control and alcohol and tobacco policies are finding their way onto the public agenda, thanks to focused community organizing that leverages power for community-driven initiatives. - Over 600 local policies have been passed to regulate the tobacco industry. Local coalitions have taken the lead by writing ordinances that address local problems and organizing broad support for them. - Nearly 100 gun control and violence prevention policies have been enacted since 1991. - Milwaukee, Boston, and Oakland are among the cities that have passed living wage ordinances: local laws that guarantee higher than minimum wages for workers, usually set as the minimum needed to keep a family of four above poverty. These are just a few of the examples that demonstrate how organizing for local policy advocacy has made inroads in areas where positive national policy had been stalled by conservatives. Increasingly, the local policy arena is where the action is and where activists are finding success. Of course, corporate interests-which are usually the target of these policies-are gearing up in defense. Tactics include front groups, economic pressure, stand for takes place in the shaping of demands. By getting into the policy arena in a proactive manner, we can take our demands to the next level. Our demands can become law, with real consequences if the agreement is broken. After all the organizing, press work, and effort, a group should leave a decisionmaker with more than a handshake and his or her word. Of course, this work requires a certain amount of interaction with "the suits," as well as struggles with the bureaucracy, the technical language, and the all-too-common resistance by decisionmakers. Still, if it's worth demanding, it's worth having in writing-whether as law, regulation, or internal policy. From ballot initiatives on rent control to laws requiring worker protections, organizers are leveraging their power into written policies that are making a real difference in their communities. Of course, policy work is just one tool in our organizing arsenal, but it is a tool we simply can't afford to ignore. Making policy work an integral part of organizing will require a certain amount of retrofitting. We will need to develop the capacity to translate our information, data, and experience into stories that are designed to affect the public conversation. Perhaps most important, we will need to move beyond fighting problems and on to framing solutions that bring us closer to our vision of how things should be. And then we must be committed to making it so.

#### 4. Institutions are key to Giroux’s pedagogy.

Giroux, Professor of Communication at McMaster, ‘4

[Henry, The Terror of Neoliberalism, p. 142-143]

There is a lot of talk among academics in the United States and elsewhere about the death of politics and the inability of human beings to imagine a more equitable and just world in order to make it better. I would hope that of all groups, educators would be the most vocal and militant in challenging this assumption by reclaiming the university’s subversive role-specifically, by combining critiques of dominant discourses and the institutional formations that support and reproduce them with the goal of limiting human suffering while at the same time attempting to create the concrete economic, political, social, and pedagogical conditions necessary for an inclusive and substantive democracy. Critical scholarship is crucial to such a task, but it is not enough. Individual and social agency becomes meaningful as part of the willingness to imagine otherwise in order to act otherwise. Scholarship has a civic and public function, and it is precisely the connection between knowledge and the larger society that makes visible its ethical and political function. Knowledge can and should be used for amplifying human freedom and promoting social justice, and not simply for creating profits or future careers. Intellectuals need to take a position, and, as Said argues, they have an obligation to “remind audiences of the moral questions that may be hidden in the clamour of public debates -. and deflate the claims of neoliberal triumphalism.”56 Combining theoretical rigour with social relevance may be risky politically and pedagogically, but the promise of a substantive democracy far outweighs the security and benefits that accompany a retreat into academic irrelevance and the safe haven of a no-risk professionalism that requires, as Paul Sabin observes, “an isolation from society and vows of political chastity.”

### 2

#### Capitalism racializes subjects to divide social groups - a race and experience based epistemology and theory of oppression breaks down the concept of class as an all encompassing theory of exploitation that is the only way to enable the unification of the proleteriat

Zavarzadeh 3 (Mas’ud, “The Pedagogy of Totality” p.11-13, in “JAC: A Journal of Rhetoric, Culture, and Politics”, Volume 23.1, http://www.jaconlinejournal.com/archives/vol23.1.html)

The pedagogy of appearance focuses on cultural representation and the role of representation in constructing the represented. By centering teaching in the machinery of "representation,"it obliterates the objective. Reducing pedagogy to lessons in cultural semiotics, it makes "experi- ence" of the pleasures of "depthless" surfaces the measure of reality and thus obscures the social relations of production that are the material conditions of that experience. However, "This 'lived' experience is not a given, given by a pure 'reality,' but the spontaneous 'lived experience' of ideology in its peculiar relationship to the real" (Althusser 223). The ideological value of the concept of "experience" in de-concep-ualizing pedagogy will perhaps become more clear in examining the way bourgeois radical pedagogues, such as Giroux, deploy experience as an instance of spontaneity to eviscerate class as an explanatory concept by which the social relations ofproperty are critiqued. In his Impure A cts- a book devoted to marginalizing explanatory concepts and popularizing "hybrids" and that, in effect, justifies political opportunism in peda- gogy- Giroux repeats the claims of such other cultural phenomenologists as Stuart Hall, Judith Butler, and Robin Kelley that "class" is "lived through race" (28). Class, in other words, is an affect. He represents this affective view ofclass as epistemological resistance against class which, he claims, is a universal category that takes the "difference" ofrace out of class. As I have already argued, epistemology is used in mainstream pedagogy as a cover for a reactionary class politics that does several things, as Giroux demonstrates. First, it segregates the "black" proletariat from the "white" proletariat and isolates both :from other "racial" prole- tariats. In doing so, Giroux's pedagogy carries out the political agenda of capital - to pit one segment ofthe proletariat against the other and to tum the unity of the working class into contesting (race) "differences." Second, it rewrites the system of wage labor itself into a hybrid. Giroux's experience-ism obscures the systematicity of wage labor and argues that there is no capitalism operating with a single logic of exploitation. Instead, there are many, aleatory, ad hoc, local arrangements between employees and employers depending on the color of the worker not the laws ofmotion ofcapital. Third, it converts capitalism from an economic system based on the"exploitation"of humans by humans(wagelabor)- through the ownership ofthe means ofproduction-into an institution of cultural "oppression" based on "power." Fourth, since class is lived through race, it is not an objective fact (the relation of the worker to ownership ofthe means ofproduction) but a subjective experience. The experience of ("living") class through race, like all experiences, is contingent, aleatory, and indeterminate. Class (lived through the experi- ence of race) is thus reconstituted as contingent - an accident not a necessity of wage labor. Fifth, since capitalism is not a system but a series of ad hoc arrangements of exchange with various workers of diverse colors, it does not produce an objective binary class system but only cultural differences. One cannot, therefore, obtain objective knowledge of capitalism. There are, in short, no laws ofmotion ofcapital; there are only "experiences" ofwork influenced by one's color. Consequently, to say-as I have said-that capitalism is a regime ofexploitation is simply a totalitarian closure. We cannot know what capitalism is because, according to Giroux's logic, it is fraught with differences (ofrace) not the singularity of"surplus labor." In Giroux's pedagogy, there is no capital- ism ("totality"), only cultural effects of capitals without capitalism ("differences"). Giroux represents his gutting of class as a radical and groundbreaking notion that will lead to liberation ofthe oppressed. However, he never completes the logic of his argument because in the end it will de-ground his position and turn it into epistemological nonsense and political pantomime. Ifclass is a universal category that obliterates the difference of race, there is (on the basis of such a claim) no reason not to say that race is also a universal category because it obliterates the difference of sexuality (and other differences), which is, by the same logic, itself a universal category since it obliterates the difference of age (and other differences), which is itselfa universal category because it obliterates the difference of (dis)ability (and other differences), which is itselfa univer- sal category because it obliterates the difference of class (and other differences). In short, the social, in Giroux's pedagogy is a circle of oppressions, none of whose components can explain any structural relations; each simply absorbs the other ("class is actually lived through race," paraphrasing Giroux) and thus points back to itself as a local knowledge ofthe affective, difference, and contingency. Class explains race; it does not absorb it as an experience (see Butler, "Merely"), nor does i t reduce it to the contingencies o f ethnicities (Hall, "New") or urban performativities (Kelley, Yo '). To put it differently, since in this pluralism of oppressions each element cancels out the explanatory capacity of all others, the existing social relations are reaffirmed in a pragmatic balancing of differences. Nothing changes, everything is resignified. The classroom of experience reduces all concepts (which it marks as "grand narratives") to affects ("little stories") and, instead of explaining the social in order to change it, only "interprets" it as a profusion of differences. Teaching becomes an affirmation of the singular-as-is; its lessons "save the honor of the name" (see Lyotard, Postmodern 82). Giroux's program is a mimesis ofthe logic of the ruling ideology: as in all pedagogies of affect, it redescribes the relation of the subject of knowledge with the world but leaves the world itselfintact byreifying the signs of"difference" (see Rorty, Contingency 53, 73). The subject, as I will discuss later in my analysis ofCary Nelson's radical pedagogy, feels differently about itself in a world that remains what it was. Giroux is putting forth a class-cleansing pedagogy: he erases class from teaching in the name ofepistemology ("totalization"). But as I have already argued, epistemology is not an issue for Giroux; it is an alibi for hollowing out from class its economic explanatory power. Epistemology in bourgeois pedagogy is class politics represented as "theory"-whose aim is to tum class into a cultural aleatory experience. In Giroux's phenomenological experientialism, lived experience is an excuse for advancing the cause of capital in a populist logic (respect for the ineluctable "experience" of the student) so that the student, the future worker, is trained as one who understands the world only through the sense-able - his own "unique" experience as black, white, or brown; man or woman; gay or straight - but never as a proletariat: a person who, regardless of race, sexuality, gender, age, or (dis)ability has to sell his or her labor power to capital in order to obtain subsistence wages in exchange. Experience, in Giroux's pedagogy, becomes a self-protecting "inside" that resists world-historical knowledge as an intrusion from "outside"; it thus valorizes ignorance as a mark of the authenticity and sovereignty ofthe subject-as independence and free choice.

#### Intellectuals on the left have been critical in normalizing the economic structure of capitalism while criticizing the textures and contours of the system – they preclude the fundamental reality that all social dynamics rely on the mode of production and not the other way around.

Ebert and Zavarzadeh in 2008(Teresa L., English, State University of New York, Albany, Mas’ud, prolific writer and expert on class ideology, “Class in Culture”, p. 36-38)

**The** cultural **activism of capital against labor**, however, **was not limited to conservative thinkers. It also** energetically **recruited Left intellectuals and "socialists of the** heart." The defense of free enterprise from the Left has always been of great cultural value to capitalism. **When Left intellectuals defend the market directly-in the guise, for example, of "market socialism"** *(Market Socialism: The Debate among Socialists,* ed. Oilman; *Why Market Socialism? Voices from Dissent,* ed. Roosevelt and Belkin)--**or denounce the enemies of capital as totalitarian, as violators of human rights, and for repressing the play of cultural meanings and thus singularity and heterogeneity** (e.g., Sidney **Hook**, Emesto **Laclau**, Jean-Francois **Lyotard**, Jacques **Derrida**), **their discourses seem more authoritative and sound more credible coming from the supposed critics of capital than do the discourses of conservative authors.** To put it precisely: **the Left has been valuable to capitalism because it has played a double role in legitimating capitalism. It has criticized capitalism as a culture, but has normalized it as an economic system** (e.g., Deleuze and Guat-tari, *Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia;* Duncombe, ed., *Cultural Resistance Reader;* Kraus and Lotringer, eds., *Hatred of Capitalism).* **It** has **complained about capitalism's** so-called corporate **culture**, **but** has **normalized it as a system of wage-labor that** is **grounded on exchange-relations and produces the corporate culture**. **The normalization of capitalism by the Left takes many forms**, **but** all **involve the justification of exploitation, which the Left represents as redemptive. They are** all **versions**-with various degrees of conceptual complexity- -**of** Nicholas D. **Kristof's argument in** his "In **Praise of the Maligned Sweatshop**." **He writes that** the sweatshops in Africa set up by capitalists of the North are in fact "opportunities" and advises that "**anyone who cares about** fighting **poverty should campaign in favor of sweatshops**." His argument is summed up by two sentences printed in boldface and foregrounded in his essay: **"What's worse than being exploited? Not being exploited**" *(The New York Times,* 6 June 2006, A-21). **What** has **made this** double **role** of postwar Left writers **so effective for capitalism is the way their** innovative **writing**, unorthodox **uses of language, and** captivating **arguments have generated** intellectual **excitement**. Jean-Paul **Sartre**, Theodor **Adorno,** Jean-Francais **Lyotard**, Jacques **Derrida**, Judith **Butler**, Jean **Baudrillard**, Jacques **Lacan**, Michel **Foucault**, Gilles **Deleuze**, Giorgio **Agamben**, Slavoj **Zizek**, **and** Stuart **Hall**, to name the most familiar authors, **have each used** quite **different**, **but** still **intellectually intriguing idioms**, **to de-historicize capitalism**. In highly subtle and nuanced arguments, **they have translated capitalism's Authoritarian economic practices**-which quietly force workers to concede to the exploitation of their labor-**into cultural values of free choice and self-sovereignty** (at the same time that they question traditional subjectivity). **Their most effective contributions to capitalism and its economic institutions have been to represent capitalism as a discursive system of meanings and** thus **divert attention away from its economic violence to its semantic transgressions-its homogenizing of meanings** in, for example, popular culture **or its erasure of difference** in cultural lifestyles. **They** have **criticized capitalism**, in other words, **for its** cultural **destruction of human imagination, but** at the same time, they **have condoned its logic of exploitation by dismantling** almost all **the conceptual apparatuses and analytics that offer a materialist understanding of capitalism as an economic system**. More specifically, they have discredited any efforts to place class at the center of understanding and to grasp the extent and violence of labor practices. They have done so, in the name of the "new" and with an ecstatic joy bordering on religious zeal (Ronell, The Telephone Book; Strangelove, The Empire of Mind: Digital Piracy and the Anti-Capitalist Movement; Gibson-Graham, A Postcapitatist Politics). Left thinkers, for example, have argued that "new" changes in capitalism-the shift, they claim, from production to consumption-have triggered "a revolution in human thought around the idea of 'culture" which, under new conditions, has itself become material, "primary and constitutive" (Hall, "The Centrality of Culture" 220, 215), and is no longer secondary and dependent on such outside matters as relations of production. Consequently, Hall and others have argued that the analytics of base/superstructure has become irrelevant to sociocultural interpretations because the "new" conditions have rendered such concepts as objectivity, cause and effect, and materialism questionable. "The old distinction" between "economic 'base' and the ideological 'superstructure" therefore can no longer be sustained because the new culture is what Fredric Jameson calls "mediatic" (Postmodernism 68). According to Hall, "media both form a critical part of the material infrastructure ... and are the principal means by which ideas and images are circulated" (Hall 209) . . . The logic of Hall's argument is obtained by treating the "material" as materialist. Media, however, are "material" only in a very trivial sense, they have a body of matter, and are a material vehicle (as a "medium"), but media are not "materialist" because, as we argue in our theory of materialism below, they do not produce "value" and are not "productive." They distribute values produced at the point of production. The un-said of Hall's claim is that production and consumption/distribution are no longer distinguishable and more significantly, labor has itself become immaterial-which is now a popular tenet in the cultural turn (Hardt and Negri, Multitude). But, even Paul Thompson, who is not without sympathy for the tum to culture, argues that "labour is never immaterial. It is not the content of labour but its commodity form that gives 'weight' to an object or idea in a market economy," and, he adds, While it is true that production has been deterritorialised to an extent, network firms are not a replacement for the assembly line and do not substitute horizontal for vertical forms of coordination. Network firms are a type of extended hierarchy, based, as Harrison observes, on concentration without centralisation: 'production may be decentralised, while power finance, distribution, and control remain concentrated among the big firms' (Lean and Mean: The Changing Landscape of Corporate Power in the Age of Flexibility, 1994: 20). Internal networks do not exist independently of these relations of production. and forms of cooperation, such as teams, are set in motion and monitored by management rather than spontaneously formed. ("Foundation and Empire: A Critique of Hardt and Negri" 84) Relations of production have shaped and will continue to shape the cultural superstructure. Changes in its phenomenology-the textures of everyday lifestyles, whether one listens to music in a concert hall, on the radio, or through an iPod-should not lead to postmodern Quixotic fantasies about the autonomy of culture from its material base [Ebert, Cultural Critique (with an attitude)]. As Marx writes, the Middle Ages could not live on Catholicism, nor could the ancient world on politics. On the contrary, it is the manner in which they gained their livelihood which explains why in one case politics, in the other case Catholicism, played the chief part .... And then there is Don Quixote who long ago paid the penalty for wrongly imagining that knight errantry was compatible with all economic forms of society. (Marx, Capital l, 176).

#### The affirmative commodifies an essentialized notion of race to frame inequality, replicating racism and shattering class-based coalitions, ensuring the capitalist social relations that build the ghettoes and favells that imprison racialized populations become inevitable, turning the case

Darder and Torres 99 (Antonia Darder, Professor of Educational Policy Studies and Latino/a Studies at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, and Rodolpho D. Torres, Professor of Planning, Policy & Design and Political Science at UC Irvine, “Shattering the ‘Race’ Lens: Toward a Critical Theory of Racism”, Chapter 7 of the book “Critical Ethnicity: Countering the Waves of Identity Politics”, edited by Robert H. Tai and Mary L. Kenyatta, p. 174-176)

Over the last three decades, there has been an overwhelming tendency among social science scholars to focus on notions of “race.” Over the last three decades, there has been an overwhelming tendency among a variety of critical scholars to focus on the concept of "race" as a central category of analysis for interpreting the social conditions of inequality and marginalization.’ As a consequence, much of the literature on subordinate cultural populations, with its emphasis on such issues as "racial inequality," "racial segregation," "racial identity," has utilized the construct of "race" as a central category of analysis for interpreting the social conditions of inequality and marginalization. ln turn, this literature has reinforced a racialized politics of identity and representation, with its problematic emphasis on "racial" identity as the overwhelming impulse for political action. This theoretical practice has led to serious analytical weaknesses and absence of depth in much of the historical and contemporary writings on racialized populations in this country. The politics of busing in the early 1970s provides an excellent example that illustrates this phenomenon. Social scientists studying "race relations" concluded that contact among "Black" and "White" students would improve "race relations" and the educational conditions of "Black" students if they were bused to "White" (better) schools outside their neighborhoods!” Thirty years later, many parents and educators adamantly denounce the busing solution (a solution based on a discourse of ”race") as not only fundamentally problematic to the fabric of African American and Chicano communities, but an erroneous social policy experiment that failed to substantially improve the overall academic performance of students in these communities. Given this legacy, it is not surprising to find that the theories, practices, and policies that have informed social science analysis of racialized populations today are overwhelmingly rooted in a politics of identity, an approach that is founded on parochial notions of "race" and representation which ignore the imperatives of capitalist accumulation and the existence of class divisions within racialized subordinate populations. The folly of this position is critiqued by Ellen Meiksins Wood in her article entitled "Identity Crisis," where she exposes the limitations of a politics of identity which fails to contend with the fact that capitalism is the most totalizing system of social relations the world has ever known. Yet, in much of the work on African American, Latino, Native American, and Asian populations, an analysis of class and a critique of capitalism is conspicuously absent. And even when it is mentioned, the emphasis is primarily on an undifferentiated plurality of identity politics or an “intersection of oppressions," which, unfortunately, ignores the overwhelming tendency of capitalism to homogenize rather than to diversify human experience. Moreover, this practice is particularly disturbing since no matter where one travels around the world, there is no question that racism is integral to the process of capital accumulation. For example, the current socioeconomic conditions of Latinos and other racialized populations can be traced to the reletless emergence of the global economy and recent economic policies of expansion, such as the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). A recent United Nations report by the International Labor Organization conﬁrms the negative impact of globalization on racialized populations. By the end of 1998, it was projected that one billion workers would be unemployed. The people of Africa, China, and Latin America have been most affected by the current restructuring of capitalist development.“ This phenomenon of racialized capitalism is directly linked to the abusive practices and destructive impact of the “global factory’ '—a global ﬁnancial enterprise system that includes such transnational corporations as Coca Cola, Walmart, Disney, Ford Motor Company, and General Motors. In a recent speech on "global economic apartheid," John Cavanagh," co-executive director of the Institute for Policy Studies in Washington, D.C., comments on the practices of the Ford Motor Company. The Ford Motor Company has its state-of-the-art assembly plant in Mexico . . . where because it can deny basic worker rights, it can pay one-tenth the wages and yet get the same quality and the same productivity in producing goods. . . .The same technologies by the way which are easing globalization are also primarily cutting more jobs than they're creating. The failure of scholars to confront this dimension in their analysis of contemporary society as a racialized phenomenon and their tendency to continue treating class as merely one of a multiplicity of (equally valid) perspectives, which may or may not "intersect" with the process of racialization, are serious shortcomings. In addressing this issue, we must recognize that identity politics, which generally gloss over class differences and/ or ignore class contradictions, have often been used by radical scholars and activists within African American, Latino, and other subordinate cultural communities in an effort to build a political base. Here, fabricated constructions of "race" are objectified and mediated as truth to ignite political support, divorced from the realities of class struggle. By so doing, they have unwittingly perpetuated the vacuous and dangerous notion that the political and economic are separate spheres of society which can function independently—a view that ﬁrmly anchors and sustains prevailing class relations of power in society.

#### The logic of capitalism results in extinction through the creation of ecological catastrophe and violent imperialist wars that will turn nuclear

Foster 5 [John Bellamy, Monthly Review, September, Vol. 57, Issue 4, “Naked Imperialism”, <http://www.monthlyreview.org/0905jbf.htm>]

From the longer view offered by a historical-materialist critique of capitalism, the direction that would be taken by U.S. imperialism following the fall of the Soviet Union was never in doubt. Capitalism by its very logic is a globally expansive system. The contradiction between its transnational economic aspirations and the fact that politically it remains rooted in particular nation states is insurmountable for the system. Yet, ill-fated attempts by individual states to overcome this contradiction are just as much a part of its fundamental logic. In present world circumstances, when one capitalist state has a virtual monopoly of the means of destruction, the temptation for that state to attempt to seize full-spectrum dominance and to transform itself into the de facto global state governing the world economy is irresistible. As the noted Marxian philosopher István Mészáros observed in Socialism or Barbarism? (2001)—written, significantly, before George W. Bush became president: “[W]hat is at stake today is not the control of a particular part of the planet—no matter how large—putting at a disadvantage but still tolerating the independent actions of some rivals, but the control of its totality by one hegemonic economic and military superpower, with all means—even the most extreme authoritarian and, if needed, violent military ones—at its disposal.” The unprecedented dangers of this new global disorder are revealed in the twin cataclysms to which the world is heading at present: nuclear proliferation and hence increased chances of the outbreak of nuclear war, and planetary ecological destruction. These are symbolized by the Bush administration’s refusal to sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty to limit nuclear weapons development and by its failure to sign the Kyoto Protocol as a first step in controlling global warming. As former U.S. Secretary of Defense (in the Kennedy and Johnson administrations) Robert McNamara stated in an article entitled “Apocalypse Soon” in the May–June 2005 issue of Foreign Policy: “The United States has never endorsed the policy of ‘no first use,’ not during my seven years as secretary or since. We have been and remain prepared to initiate the use of nuclear weapons—by the decision of one person, the president—against either a nuclear or nonnuclear enemy whenever we believe it is in our interest to do so.” The nation with the greatest conventional military force and the willingness to use it unilaterally to enlarge its global power is also the nation with the greatest nuclear force and the readiness to use it whenever it sees fit—setting the whole world on edge. The nation that contributes more to carbon dioxide emissions leading to global warming than any other (representing approximately a quarter of the world’s total) has become the greatest obstacle to addressing global warming and the world’s growing environmental problems—raising the possibility of the collapse of civilization itself if present trends continue. The United States is seeking to exercise sovereign authority over the planet during a time of widening global crisis: economic stagnation, increasing polarization between the global rich and the global poor, weakening U.S. economic hegemony, growing nuclear threats, and deepening ecological decline. The result is a heightening of international instability. Other potential forces are emerging in the world, such as the European Community and China,that could eventually challenge U.S. power, regionally and even globally. Third world revolutions, far from ceasing, are beginning to gain momentum again, symbolized by Venezuela’s Bolivarian Revolution under Hugo Chávez. U.S. attempts to tighten its imperial grip on the Middle East and its oil have had to cope with a fierce, seemingly unstoppable, Iraqi resistance, generating conditions of imperial overstretch. With the United States brandishing its nuclear arsenal and refusing to support international agreements on the control of such weapons, nuclear proliferation is continuing. New nations, such as North Korea, are entering or can be expected soon to enter the “nuclear club.” Terrorist blowback from imperialist wars in the third world is now a well-recognized reality, generating rising fear of further terrorist attacks in New York, London, and elsewhere. Such vast and overlapping historical contradictions, rooted in the combined and uneven development of the global capitalist economy along with the U.S. drive for planetary domination, foreshadow what is potentially the most dangerous period in the history of imperialism. The course on which U.S and world capitalism is now headed points to global barbarism—or worse. Yet it is important to remember that nothing in the development of human history is inevitable. There still remains an alternative path—the global struggle for a humane, egalitarian, democratic, and sustainable society. The classic name for such a society is “socialism.” Such a renewed struggle for a world of substantive human equality must begin by addressing the system’s weakest link and at the same time the world’s most pressing needs—by organizing a global resistance movement against the new naked imperialism.

#### Vote negative to adopt the historical material criticism of the 1NC - historical analysis of the material conditions of capital is the only way to break free from is contradictions and social inequalities it causes

Tumino 1 (Steven, teaches at the City University of New York, Spring, What is Orthodox Marxism and Why it Matters Now More Than Ever Before)

Any effective political theory will have to do at least two things: it will have to offer an integrated understanding of social practices and, based on such an interrelated knowledge, offer a guideline for praxis. My main argument here is that among all contesting social theories now, only Orthodox Marxism has been able to produce an integrated knowledge of the existing social totality and provide lines of praxis that will lead to building a society free from necessity. But first I must clarify what I mean by Orthodox Marxism. Like all other modes and forms of political theory, the very theoretical identity of Orthodox Marxism is itself contested—not just from non-and anti-Marxists who question the very "real" (by which they mean the "practical" as under free-market criteria) existence of any kind of Marxism now but, perhaps more tellingly, from within the Marxist tradition itself. I will, therefore, first say what I regard to be the distinguishing marks of Orthodox Marxism and then outline a short polemical map of contestation over Orthodox Marxism within the Marxist theories now. I will end by arguing for its effectivity in bringing about a new society based not on human rights but on freedom from necessity. I will argue that to know contemporary society—and to be able to act on such knowledge—one has to first of all know what makes the existing social totality. I will argue that the dominant social totality is based on inequality—not just inequality of power but inequality of economic access (which then determines access to health care, education, housing, diet, transportation, . . . ). This systematic inequality cannot be explained by gender, race, sexuality, disability, ethnicity, or nationality. These are all secondary contradictions and are all determined by the fundamental contradiction of capitalism which is inscribed in the relation of capital and labor. All modes of Marxism now explain social inequalities primarily on the basis of these secondary contradictions and in doing so—and this is my main argument—legitimate capitalism. Why? Because such arguments authorize capitalism without gender, race, discrimination and thus accept economic inequality as an integral part of human societies. They accept a sunny capitalism—a capitalism beyond capitalism. Such a society, based on cultural equality but economic inequality, has always been the not-so-hidden agenda of the bourgeois left—whether it has been called "new left," "postmarxism," or "radical democracy." This is, by the way, the main reason for its popularity in the culture industry—from the academy (Jameson, Harvey, Haraway, Butler,. . . ) to daily politics (Michael Harrington, Ralph Nader, Jesse Jackson,. . . ) to. . . . For all, capitalism is here to stay and the best that can be done is to make its cruelties more tolerable, more humane. This humanization (not eradication) of capitalism is the sole goal of ALL contemporary lefts (marxism, feminism, anti-racism, queeries, . . . ). Such an understanding of social inequality is based on the fundamental understanding that the source of wealth is human knowledge and not human labor. That is, wealth is produced by the human mind and is thus free from the actual objective conditions that shape the historical relations of labor and capital. Only Orthodox Marxism recognizes the historicity of labor and its primacy as the source of all human wealth. In this paper I argue that any emancipatory theory has to be founded on recognition of the priority of Marx's labor theory of value and not repeat the technological determinism of corporate theory ("knowledge work") that masquerades as social theory.

#### Class divisions are the root of all other oppressions

Kovel 2 (Alger Hiss Professor of Social Studies at Bard College, awarded Fellowship at the John Guggenheim Foundation, Joel, The Enemy of Nature, pages 123-124)

If, however, we ask the question of efficacy, that is, which split sets the others into motion, then priority would have to be given to class, for the plain reason that class relations entail the state as an instrument of enforce­ment and control, and it is the state that shapes and organizes the splits that appear in human ecosystems. Thus class is both logically and historically distinct from other forms of exclusion (hence we should not talk of 'classism' to go along with 'sexism' and 'racism,' and `species-ism'). This is, first of all, because class is an essentially man-made category, without root in even a mystified biology. We cannot imagine a human world without gender dis­tinctions – although we can imagine a world without domination by gender. But a world without class is eminently imaginable – indeed, such was the human world for the great majority of our species' time on earth, during all of which considerable fuss was made over gender. Historically, the difference arises because 'class' signifies one side of a larger figure that includes a state apparatus whose conquests and regulations create races and shape gender relations. Thus there will be no true resolution of racism so long as class society stands, inasmuch as a racially oppressed society implies the activities of a class-defending state.'° Nor can gender inequality be enacted away so long as class society, with its state, demands the super-exploitation of woman's labour. Class society continually generates gender, racial, ethnic oppressions and the like, which take on a life of their own, as well as profoundly affecting the concrete relations of class itself. It follows that class politics must be fought out in terms of all the active forms of social splitting. It is the management of these divisions that keeps state society functional. Thus though each person in a class society is reduced from what s/he can become, the varied reductions can be combined into the great stratified regimes of history — this one becoming a fierce warrior, that one a routine-loving clerk, another a submissive seamstress, and so on, until we reach today's personi­fications of capital and captains of industry. Yet no matter how functional a class society, the profundity of its ecological violence ensures a basic antagonism which drives history onward. History is the history of class society — because no matter how modified, so powerful a schism is bound to work itself through to the surface, provoke resistance (`class struggle'), and lead to the succession of powers. The relation of class can be mystified without end — only consider the extent to which religion exists for just this purpose, or watch a show glorifying the police on television — yet so long as we have any respect for human nature, we must recognize that so funda­mental an antagonism as would steal the vital force of one person for the enrichment of another cannot be conjured away.

#### Historical materialism must come first - it predetermines consciousness and the very possibilities of reflective thinking

**Marx 1859** (Karl, a pretty important dude. “A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy: Preface” http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1859/critique-pol-economy/preface.htm) JM

>edited for gendered language<

In the social production of their existence, [people] inevitably enter into definite relations, which are independent of their will, namely relations of production appropriate to a given stage in the development of their material forces of production. The totality of these relations of production constitutes the economic structure of society, the real foundation, on which arises a legal and political superstructure and to which correspond definite forms of social consciousness. The mode of production of material life conditions the general process of social, political and intellectual life. It is not the consciousness of [people] that determines their existence, but their social existence that determines their consciousness. At a certain stage of development, the material productive forces of society come into conflict with the existing relations of production or – this merely expresses the same thing in legal terms – with the property relations within the framework of which they have operated hitherto. From forms of development of the productive forces these relations turn into their fetters. Then begins an era of social revolution. The changes in the economic foundation lead sooner or later to the transformation of the whole immense superstructure. In studying such transformations it is always necessary to distinguish between the material transformation of the economic conditions of production, which can be determined with the precision of natural science, and the legal, political, religious, artistic or philosophic – in short, ideological forms in which [people] become conscious of this conflict and fight it out. Just as one does not judge an individual by what he thinks about himself, so one cannot judge such a period of transformation by its consciousness, but, on the contrary, this consciousness must be explained from the contradictions of material life, from the conflict existing between the social forces of production and the relations of production. No social order is ever destroyed before all the productive forces for which it is sufficient have been developed, and new superior relations of production never replace older ones before the material conditions for their existence have matured within the framework of the old society.

### Case

#### Can’t solve neoliberalism – the right will co-opt the plan’s invigoration of public spaces to prevent a genuine societal transformation.

Vincent, PhD candidate in American studies at the University of Illinois, ‘6

[Jonathan, Teaches American Literature and composition, “A Call to Arms in a Repressive Atmosphere of Educational Acquiescence”, Pedagogy 6.1 (2006) 189-198, JSTOR, RSR]

Take Back Higher Education labors tirelessly to map out a course for critical dissent, but that dissent must come with a caveat. As groups of younger educators like myself approach careers in the humanities, the political needs of our moment loom larger than mere recuperations of past political agendas are sufficient to address. Let me offer a few judgments that might at least complicate the unbridled optimistic enthusiasm generated by the book and shamelessly take my seat among the purgatory of cynics and skeptics banished so dramatically in the book's introduction. While it is seductive and intoxicating amid an accurately assessed milieu of atrophy to hope for a return "back" to once "vibrant" forms of political agency, we might want to reorient our gaze to consider just how profoundly successful conservative regimes of power have been at distilling notions like citizenship and democracy of their potency. The most cursory familiarity of republican rhetoric under our current presidential administration will reveal just how appropriated the values of leftist discourse have become. That the Girouxs feel confident in rallying the depleted leftist regiments around the weary banners of enlightenment rhetoric—democracy, freedom, rights, justice, equality, the public sphere, [End Page 196] social contract—should at least register a moment of cautious consideration. Neoconservative speechwriters and conservative-media spin machines have sufficiently hijacked precisely these bourgeois badges and emblems of participatory democracy and leftist struggle. Indeed, the Girouxs' nostalgia for the emancipatory moment of New Left activism might actually be impeding a deeper recognition of just how thoroughly contained an "outside" to power has become in an epoch constrained by what Michel Foucault (1990) has described as a "biopolitical" saturation of sites of resistance and the regulatory ontological composites of its political subjects. That is, the Girouxs might consider augmenting their political initiatives with the analysis of some postmodern theorists exiled for their complicity with "obtuseness" and "rhetorical cleverness" (98). The possibility of reversing or, at best, keeping at bay the tide of global capitalism from institutional outposts like the corporate university is, frankly, not very compelling, nor does it account for the way that those outposts are already constituted and structured by relations of power that precede and contain adversarial processes. In a recent piece in Bad Subjects, for example, Joe Lockard and Joel Schalit (2004: n.p.) demonstrate how many forms of protest have been championed by the Bush administration and the military as instances of the state's reflexivity. "For contemporary neo-liberalism," they argue, "civil protest constitutes the enunciation of a self-correcting mechanism where perfected repression derives from free expression." This "repressive tolerance" works to capture and distill the dialectical power of protest whereby "the state enables opposition only in order to moderate it." Protest in and of itself can, in many instances, work to validate and ensure the legitimacy of neoliberal philosophies of the state. The Girouxs' spirit of optimism about older forms of social activism really prevents them from eliciting any particular, specifically identifiable strategies for how these "challenges" will be accomplished. The few dismal examples of Web sites and discussion groups leave much to be desired against the onslaught of a new totalitarian machine that has mastered the discourse of older forms of leftism.

#### Giroux’s method fails – never specifies the alternative.

Franks, Lecturer in Social and Political Philosophy at the University of Glasgow, 7

[Benjamin, 2007, Variant issue 29, “Who Are You to tell me to Question Authority?”, http://www.variant.org.uk/29texts/Franks29.html]

Potentially stronger criticisms of Giroux’s text lie precisely in his underlying hypothesis concerning the totalising power of neo-conservatism. Giroux shares with the members of the Frankfurt School, who he approvingly cites, a pessimistic and almost wholly determined account of future social developments, in which the prognosis for alternatives to dominant powers looks bleak. Giroux, like Adorno and Marcuse, fears that we are approaching a one-dimensional future composed of intellectually stunted individuals, who are manipulated by the cultural industries, endorse militarised social hierarchies and engage in relationships conceived of only in terms of market-values. This grim dystopia is subject to continual monitoring by an evermore technologically-equipped police and legitimised by an increasingly subservient, partisan and trivial media. However, whilst Giroux’s account of growing authoritarianism is convincingly expressed, it is potentially disempowering, as it would suggest little space for opposition. It is not simply wishful thinking to suggest that the existing power structures are neither as complete nor as impervious as Giroux’s account would suggest. Whilst the old media of radio, film and television are increasingly dominated by a few giant corporations (p.46), new technologies have opened access to dissident voices and created new forms of communication and organisation. Whilst the military are extending their reach into greater areas of social and political life, and intervening in greater force throughout the globe, resistance to military discipline is also arising, with fewer willing to join the army in both the US and UK.7 Bush’s long term military objectives look increasingly unfeasible as Peter Schoomaker, the former US Chief of Staff, told Congress on December 15, 2006 that even the existing deployment policy is looking increasingly ‘untenable’.8 The ‘overstretch’ of military resources is matched by an economy incapable of fulfilling its primary neo-conservative goals of low taxation, sound national finances and extensive military interventions. Whilst this is not to suggest that the US is on the point of financial implosion, the transition to a fully proto-fascist state is unlikely to be seamless or certain. Giroux’s preferred form of resistance is radical education. The photographs from Abu Ghraib were iconic not just in their encapsulation of proto-fascism, but in their public pedagogic role. Their prominence highlighted the many different sites of interpretation, as Giroux rightly stresses, there is no single way to interpret a photograph, however potent the depiction. The ability to interpret an image requires an ongoing process by a critical citizenry capable of identifying the methods by which a picture’s meanings are constructed (p. 135). Giroux’s critical pedagogy overtly borrows from Adorno’s essay ‘Education After Auschwitz’, and proposes “modes of education that produce critical, engaging and free minds” (p. 141). But herein lies one of the flaws with the text: Giroux never spells out what sorts of existing institutions and social practices are practical models of this critical pedagogy. Thus, he does not indicate what methods he finds appropriate in resisting the proto-fascist onslaught nor how merely interpreting images critically would fundamentally contest hierarchical power-relationships. Questions arise as to the adequacy of his response to the totalising threat he identifies in the main section of the book. Clearly existing academic institutions in the US are barely adequate given the campaigns against dissident academics led by David Horowitz (p.143). Giroux recounts in the final chapter, an interview conducted by Sina Rahmani, his own flight from the prestigious Penn State University to McMaster University in Canada because of managerial harassment following his public criticisms of Penn’s involvement in military research (p. 186). But whilst Giroux recognises that education is far wider than what takes place in institutions of learning there is no account of what practical forms these take. Nor does Giroux give an account of why a critical pedagogy would take priority over informed aesthetic or ethical practices. Such a concentration on education would appear to prioritise those who already have (by virtue of luck or social circumstance) an already existing expertise in critical thinking, risking an oppressive power-relationship in which the expert drills the student into rigorous assessment. This lapse into the role of the strident instructor demanding the correct form of radical response, occasionally appears in Giroux’s text: “within the boundaries of critical education, students have to learn the skills and knowledge to narrate their own stories [and] resist the fragmentation and seductions of market ideologies” (p. 155). Woe betide the student who prefers to narrate the story of the person sitting next to them, or fails to measure up to the ‘educators’ standard of critical evaluation

#### Epistemology doesn’t determine reality – we can have a flawed epistemology but still prescribe good actions.

Wight, University of Exeter School of Humanities and social sciences politics department, ‘7

[Colin, “Inside the epistemological cave all bets are off” <http://www.ciaonet.org/olj/jird/jird_200703_v10n1_d.pdf>, p.43-46, accessed 10-22-11, TAP]

In some respects, this might seem to place me close to the position that Kratochwil suggests is absurd. For is not my position a form of ‘anything goes’? Well, again agreeing with Kratochwil that we should reject traditional logic and its associated yes or no answers, I will reply both yes and no. 10 Yes, it is an ‘anything goes’ position insofar as I reject outright that we need to commit ourselves to any particular epistemological position in advance of making or judging particular knowledge claims. I can see no good reason for giving any specific epistemological standpoint a position of a priori privilege. But I can also answer no because this position does not mean that we are unable to make informed judgements on the basis of the evidence for the claim. The fact that philosophers have been unable to provide secure foundations for one or other epistemological stance does not alter the fact that we continue to use these positions to get along in the world. In this respect, I agree completely with Kratochwil’s claim (2007: 11) that both absolute certainty and absolute doubt are impossible positions to hold, and that we ‘go on’in a situation located somewhere in between. It may be philosophically naıve of me to claim that if I wish to know how many cars are parked in my drive, then the easiest way is to probably go and look. But I can do this without needing philosophy to prove empiricism infallible. Equally, in certain circumstances I might be able to ascertain how many cars are in my drive without looking; if, for example, I know that at time T1 that there were three cars and that one went away at time T2, then, if asked at time T3 (assuming these events are sequential), I have a legitimate case to say ‘two’. Of course, in either case, I could still be wrong but the point is that the claim about the existence of a certain number of cars can justifiably be supported on various epistemological grounds and we do not know in advance which will be the most appropriate. Hence the context in which the claim emerges is also an important aspect of its validity. In both cases, there is no doubt that observation or the process of rational deduction is theoretically laden, but to say that our concepts help carve up the world in certain ways is not to accept that they either determine the physicality of what exists or can, in all cases, stop an object from existing. 11 Again, in some respects, my position might appear to be quite close to Kratochwil’s pragmatist alternative. After all, pragmatists generally argue that we should do what works. There are certainly aspects of Kratochwil’s position that do suggest some affinities with my notion of epistemological opportunism. Thus, for example, he argues that ‘each science provides its own court and judges the appropriateness of its own methods and practices’(Kratochwil 2007: 12). This is, indeed, the position scientific realists adopt in relation to epistemological and methodological matters, although Kratochwil seems to reject that scientific realism out of hand. 12 But it is not clear why each science would need to judge the appropriateness of its own methods and practices unless there are some fundamental ontological differences that distinguish the object of study; which is exactly why scientific realists insist that ontology forms the starting point of all enquiry, not the a priori commitment to a set of scientific methods. According to the positivist view of science, there is a general set of rules, procedures and axioms which, when taken together, constitute the ‘scientific method’. Although the various strands of positivism disagree over the exact form of these axioms, the need to define them is common to all versions (Halfpenny 1982). For scientific realists, on the other hand, there can be no ‘scientific method’because differing phenomena will require differing modes of investigation and perhaps different models of explanation. This argument is embedded in the differing ontological domains that concern the individual sciences. Hence there can be no scientific method as such, since differing object domains will require methods appropriate to their study and a range of epistemological supports. Kratochwil’s position is very different. He accepts that we have to ‘search for viable criteria of assessment of our theories’(Kratochwil 2007: 1), but exactly which criteria does he suggest? First, he explicitly rejects the notion that the world itself will play any role, arguing that ‘if we recognize the constitutive nature of our concepts then we have to accept that we never ‘‘test’’ against the ‘‘real world’’ but only against other more or less-articulated theories’ (Kratochwil 2007: 3). The use of ‘never’is a very strong statement and seems to rule out any role for empirical research. 13 Of course, Kratochwil may argue that by ‘real world’he does not mean the world of experience but some Platonic realm beyond experience. But, in so doing, he would be aligning himself with the positivists who also denied the possibility of accessing reality beyond that which can be experienced. Equally, of course, the empirical is part of the real world even if it does not exhaust it. Ultimately I think Kratochwil, like the positivists, does treat the world as the ‘world of experience’. This means that he has a very philosophically idealist notion of the real world, which also means that rather than transcending the materialist/idealist dichotomy, he is clearly on one side of it. 14 There is, however, some confusion regarding this issue. For example, despite claiming that the objects of experience are the result of our constructions and interests, he also argues that no one really contests the claim that there is a common substratum to these objects (Kratochwil 2007: 6). Equally in previous work he has claimed that no one seriously doubts the existence of an independent world (Kratochwil 2000: 91). Given these claims, it seems that the point he is trying to make is the relatively uncontested idea that we describe the world in certain ways and that those descriptions play a role, perhaps even determine, in how we interact with the world. I know of no one who would object to this, but this is a long way from the claim that we construct objects in a physical sense, by describing them in particular ways, or that the world plays no role in terms of the assessment of our claims. To illustrate this issue he uses the example of a table, which he claims is something entirely different to a ‘physicist, the chemist, the cabinet maker, the user, or the art historian’(Kratochwil 2007: 6). Now, of course, how we use a table, or how we describe it is almost exclusively a matter of our discourses and interests. No one doubts this. Nor does anyone doubt that objects can be described in a number of differing ways. Yet the fact still remains that in order for any object to function as a table it needs to have a set of properties such that it can fulfill that role. Hence, we construct tables out of materials, such as wood, that have the properties of being able to support objects placed on them. No matter how creative we are within our community of rule-following scientists, we are not yet able to construct tables out of water. 15 Thus, the world itself simply cannot be discarded in the manner Kratochwil suggests. One can think of many such examples where the world does in a very real and important sense talk to us: penalizing any attempt to put out fires using petrol rather than water for example; attempting to run our cars by packing them with environmental waste; or attempting to feed the starving of the world on fresh air as opposed to substances that provide nutritional value. 16 If Kratochwil’s idealist metaphysics were correct, all of these should be possible as long as we have an interest in achieving them, and providing enough of a given community followed the rules governing this process. The nature of matter itself, however, seems to block this move, which, because we continuously interact with the material world, cannot be simply described, as Kratochwil does, as ‘irrelevant’(Kratochwil 2007: 6). In a very meaningful and practical sense the world does communicate with us, accepting or rejecting our attempts to fashion it in ways to suit our interests on the basis of its specific modes of being (Pickering 1995). Likewise, when physicists or chemists interact with a table they generally do so in terms of it being a table, to place computers on, etc. 17 Similarly, art historians also relate to tables as tables and only treat particular tables with additional properties as ‘art objects’. And it is not just any table that can function as a work of art, but only a table that does indeed possess certain properties that match it to the rules that determine what constitutes an ‘art object’. Without this, just about any table would do and the notion of forgery in art would be redundant. Of course, these issues are infinitely more complicated in the social world where existence is dependent upon language and concepts. 18 Nonetheless, even in this realm existential claims made by theorists in academia are not a necessary, or sufficient, element to bring social objects into being, and nor do academic claims to the contrary stop particular social objects from existing. Social objects existed long before institutionally located social scientists attempted to describe them. Equally, in order to transcend the materialism/idealism dichotomy, we should be wary of embracing too sharp a distinction between natural and social processes. Accordingly, it is the case that human patterns of behaviour are impacting on global environmental processes in ways we have yet to fully understand and these processes will continue irrespective of whether we reach an intersubjective agreement on what they mean. And, of course, these same human-influenced processes will react back on social life in unforeseen ways, again often irrespective of our descriptions of them. 19

#### Prioritizing epistemology reifies, rewards extremism and causes self-serving scholarship.

Lake, Jerri-Ann and Gary E. Jacobs Professor of Social Sciences and Distinguished Professor of Political Science at the University of California – San Diego, ‘11

[David, “Why ‘‘isms’’ Are Evil: Theory, Epistemology, and Academic Sects as Impediments to Understanding and Progress”, International Studies Quarterly, 2011, 55, 465-480, RSR]

The question of epistemology in international studies suffers from the same pathologies for theories outlined earlier, and which I need not repeat here. We reify each approach, reward extremism, fail to specify research designs completely, apply epistemologies selectively where they are most likely to work, and then claim universality. Through these pathologies, we not only create academic religions of different theories but also become committed to academic sects with different epistemologies. Like our theories, these epistemologies have become increasingly politicized and used as criteria and even weapons in power struggles within the discipline. Gatekeepers increasingly use one’s adherence to this or that epistemological religion to determine who gets hired where, who gets access to resources, and who is accepted in various professional networks. We increasingly talk and interact only with others of our same epistemological persuasion. Yet, although it may disappoint partisans, I can think of no objective reason to prefer one epistemology over another. Rather, the choice of epistemology by scholars appears to be largely subjective. We appear to be drawn to one or the other approach by intuition: one form of explanation simply feels right. Some are satisfied only when an event is placed in its full historical perspective with all the conjunctures and counterfactuals accounted for. Others are satisfied only when events accord with an appropriately derived hypothesis that has passed many demanding experimental tests. For myself, I read a lot in history—far more than I read in political science—and benefit from and enjoy these mostly narrative accounts immensely. But at the same time, I am usually not persuaded by causal claims that lack well-specified theories and experimental tests. In turn, while most of my own research has focused on the history of US foreign policy, the cases are treated within a nomological approach (see Lake 1988, 1999). One can move across the divide without finding the causal claims on the other side especially satisfying.

## 2NC

#### Missing. Zach lost it. Blame him. It was on framework.

## 1NR

### Cap

#### NO VALUE TO LIFE UNDER CAP – ONLY THE ALT CAN SOLVE

Dillon 99 Michael Dillon, University of Lancaster, “Another Justice” *Political Theory* Vol. 27, No. 2, Aprill 1999, JSTOR

Otherness is born(e) within the self as an integral part of itself and in such a way that it always remains an inherent stranger to itself." It derives from the lack, absence, or ineradicable incompleteness which comes from having no security of tenure within or over that of which the self is a particular hermeneutical manifestation; namely, being itself. The point about the human, betrayed by this absence, is precisely that it is not sovereignly self-possessed and complete, enjoying undisputed tenure in and of itself. Modes of justice therefore reliant upon such a subject lack the very foundations in the self that they most violently insist upon seeing inscribed there. This does not, however, mean that the dissolution of the subject also entails the dissolution of Justice. Quite the reverse. The subject was never a firm foundation for justice, much less a hospitable vehicle for the reception of the call of another Justice. It was never in possession of that self-possession which was supposed to secure the certainty of itself, of a self-possession that would enable it ultimately to adjudicate everything. The very indexicality required of sovereign subjectivity gave rise rather to a commensurability much more amenable to the expendability required of the political and material economies of mass societies than it did to the singular, invaluable, and uncanny uniqueness of the self. The value of the subject became the standard unit of currency for the political arithmetic of States and the political economies of capitalism. They trade in it still to devastating global effect. The technologisation of the political has become manifest and global. Economies of evaluation necessarily require calculability. Thus no valuation without mensuration and no mensuration without indexation. Once rendered calculable, however, units of account are necessarily submissible not only to valuation but also, of course, to devaluation. Devaluation, logically, can extend to the point of counting as nothing. Hence, no mensuration without demensuration either. There is nothing abstract about this: the declension of economies of value leads to the zero point of holocaust. However liberating and emancipating systems of value-rights-may claim to be, for example, they run the risk of counting out the invaluable. Counted out, the invaluable may then lose its purchase on life. Herewith, then, the necessity of championing the invaluable itself. For we must never forget that, "we are dealing always with whatever exceeds measure. But how does that necessity present itself? Another Justice answers: as the surplus of the duty to answer to the claim of Justice over rights. That duty, as with the advent of another Justice, is integral to the lack constitutive of the human way of being.

#### Race and class are reproduced within capitalist relations – capitalism racializes subjects to force competition and divides social groups by obfuscating labor consciousness – this is a way to mask contradiction and maintain capital accumulation

San Juan 3 (E, Fullbright lecturer @ U of Leuven, Belgium, “Marxism and the Race/Class Problematic: A Re-Articulation”, <http://clogic.eserver.org/2003/sanjuan.html>)

It seems obvious that racism cannot be dissolved by instances of status mobility when sociohistorical circumstances change gradually or are transformed by unforeseen interventions. The black bourgeoisie continues to be harassed and stigmatized by liberal or multiculturalist practices of racism, not because they drive Porsches or conspicuously flaunt all the indices of wealth. Class exploitation cannot replace or stand for racism because it is the **condition of possibility** for it. It is what enables the racializing of selected markers, whether physiological or cultural, to maintain, deepen and reinforce alienation, mystifying reality by modes of commodification, fetishism, and reification characterizing the routine of quotidian life. Race and class are dialectically conjoined in the reproduction of capitalist relations of exploitation and domination. 30. We might take a passage from Marx as a source of guidelines for developing a historical-materialist theory of racism which is not empiricist but dialectical in aiming for theorizing conceptual concreteness as a multiplicity of historically informed and configured determinations. This passage comes from a letter dated 9 April 1870 to Meyer and Vogt in which Marx explains why the Irish struggle for autonomy was of crucial significance for the British proletariat: . . . Every industrial and commercial center in England possesses a working class divided into two hostile camps, English proletarians and Irish proletarians. The ordinary English worker hates the Irish worker as a competitor who lowers his standard of life. In relation to the Irish worker he feels himself a member of the ruling nation and so turns himself into a tool of the aristocrats and capitalists of his country against Ireland, thus strengthening their domination over himself. He cherishes religious, social, and national prejudices against the Irish worker. His attitude towards him is much the same as that of the 'poor whites' to the 'niggers' in the former slave states of the USA. The Irishman pays him back with interest in his own money. He sees in the English worker at once the accomplice and stupid tool of the English rule in Ireland. This antagonism is artificially kept alive and intensified by the press, the pulpit, the comic papers, in short by all the means at the disposal of the ruling classes. This antagonism is the secret of the impotence of the English working class, despite its organization. It is the secret by which the capitalist class maintains its power. And that class is fully aware of it (quoted in Callinicos 1993). Here Marx sketches three parameters for the sustained viability of racism in modern capitalist society. First, the economic competition among workers is dictated by the distribution of labor power in the labor-market via differential wage rates. The distinction between skilled and unskilled labor is contextualized in differing national origins, languages and traditions of workers, which can be manipulated into racial antagonisms. Second, the appeal of racist ideology to white workers, with their identification as members of the "ruling nation" affording--in W.E.B. DuBois's words--"public and psychological wage" or compensation. Like religion, white-supremacist nationalism provides the illusory resolution to the real contradictions of life for the working majority of citizens. Third, the ruling class reinforces and maintains these racial divisions for the sake of capital accumulation within the framework of its ideological/political hegemony in the metropolis and worldwide. 31. Racism and nationalism are thus modalities in which class struggles articulate themselves at strategic points in history. No doubt social conflicts in recent times have involved not only classes but also national, ethnic, and religious groups, as well as feminist, ecological, antinuclear social movements (Bottomore 1983). The concept of "internal colonialism" (popular in the seventies) that subjugates national minorities, as well as the principle of self-determination for oppressed or "submerged" nations espoused by Lenin, exemplify dialectical attempts to historicize the collective agency for socialist transformation. Within the framework of the global division of labor between metropolitan center and colonized periphery, a Marxist program of national liberation is meant to take into account the extraction of surplus value from colonized peoples through unequal exchange as well as through direct colonial exploitation in "Free Trade Zones," illegal traffic in prostitution, mail-order brides, and contractual domestics (at present, the Philippines provides the bulk of the latter, about ten million persons and growing). National oppression has a concrete reality not entirely reducible to class exploitation but incomprehensible apart from it; that is, it cannot be adequately understood without the domination of the racialized peoples in the dependent formations by the colonizing/imperialist power, with the imperial nation-state acting as the exploiting class, as it were (see San Juan 1998; 2002). 32. Racism arose with the creation and expansion of the capitalist world economy (Wolf 1982; Balibar and Wallerstein, 1991). Solidarities conceived as racial or ethnic groups acquire meaning and value in terms of their place within the social organization of production and reproduction of the ideological-political order; ideologies of racism as collective social evaluation of solidarities arise to reinforce structural constraints which preserve the exploited and oppressed position of these "racial" solidarities. Such patterns of economic and political segmentation mutate in response to the impact of changing economic and political relationships (Geshwender and Levine 1994). Overall, there is no denying the fact that national-liberation movements and indigenous groups fighting for sovereignty, together with heterogeneous alliances and coalitions, cannot be fully understood without a critical analysis of the production of surplus value and its expropriation by the propertied class--that is, capital accumulation. As John Rex noted, different ethnic groups are placed in relations of cooperation, symbiosis or conflict by the fact that as groups they have different economic and political functions.Within this changing class order of [colonial societies], the language of racial difference frequently becomes the means whereby men allocate each other to different social and economic positions. What the type of analysis used here suggests is that the exploitation of clearly marked groups in a variety of different ways is integral to capitalism and that ethnic groups unite and act together because they have been subjected to distinct and differentiated types of exploitation. Race relations and racial conflict are necessarily structured by political and economic factors of a more generalized sort (1983, 403-05, 407). Hence race relations and race conflict are necessarily structured by the larger totality of the political economy of a given society, as well as by modifications in the structure of the world economy. Corporate profit-making via class exploitation on an international/globalized scale, at bottom, still remains the logic of the world system of finance capitalism based on historically changing structures and retooled practices of domination and subordination.

#### Capitalism provides the better analysis of the creation of the border. Ever since the border was created Mexican immigrants have been allowed into the State for the purpose of providing cheap and expendable labor

Bach 78

(Robert L, former director of the Global Inclusion Division of the Rockefeller Foundation, *“Mexican Immigration and the American State,”* International Migration Review, Winter 1978, JSTOR)

The rise of the liberal state at the national level corresponds to the rapid incorporation of regions of Mexico and the U.S. into a single structure of accumulation. The commodity chains established earlier continued to expand both in number and volume as U.S. railroads extended into Mexico and Western commercial agriculture boomed (McWilliams, 1942). The flow of landless workers from Mexico also increased along the expanded commercial routes. Earlier migrations of Mexicans to Texas to work in the cotton fields and in basic processing plants were complemented by a larger volume of Mexican laborers moving to help construct and maintain the railroads (Dillingham Commission, 1911; Bureau of Labor Statistics, 1939). Simultaneously, the development of refrigerated railroad cars and improved methods of food preservation fueled the expansion of Western agriculture. The demand for manual labor increased as irrigation expanded the amount of land available for cultivation (Reisler, 1976). This increased demand came mainly from that sector of capital which was tied closely to the market or had need of large amounts of manual labor. That is, from the earliest periods Mexican labor was involved in only a fragmented part of the total accumulation process. The demand for Mexican labor developed out of an expressed need for a particular type of worker; one that would work for low wages and did not make competitive demands on precious agricultural land (Clark, 1908). Japanese laborers were employed extensively throughout this period but their attempted organization and land settlement challenged the monopoly of the growers. Consequently, the growers' associations turned to the available Mexican Labor. It did not take long for the employers to recognize the importance of the ease at which Mexican labor could be deported or made to 'voluntarily' leave the area of employment (Department of Commerce and Labor, 1909). That is, the structural nature of the powerlessness of the Mexican laborer, based on the original exclusion at the border, was quickly realized. The growing demand for Mexican labor by commercial agriculture and competitive manufacturers first encountered problems with national reforms when the 1917 Immigration Act placed restrictions on the character of legal entries. The growers, of course, responded with outcries about the danger to continued agricultural production if the Mexican labor was not made available. The state intervened to facilitate accumulation as the Secretary of Labor issued a departmental order waiving the literacy test, head tax and contract labor clause. However, even though this state action served the direct interests of a particular sector of capital, the state was acting well within the framework of its liberal tendencies. The departmental order from the Labor Secretary invoked a clause of the national act that gave him the power to "issue rules and prescribe conditions ... to control and regulate the admission and return of otherwise inadmissible aliens applying for temporary admission". The emerging liberal state continued to promote accumulation through greater regulation during World War I. The War gave the progressives an opportunity to intervene and regulate markets, including the labor market, within a framework of relative acquiescence from trade unions. In the Southwest, President Wilson authorized the Food Administration and the U.S. Employment Service to act as employers and contractors with Mexican workers as they crossed the border (Reisler, 1976). However, direct attempts by Southwest growers to have the immigration restrictions repealed were defeated. While the trade unions had accepted the temporary admissions during the war, they clearly opposed extensions after the War (American Federation of Labor, 1920)

#### You cannot permute a method – it strips out all of the conceptual theory that allows us both understand the world and to create a praxis to end oppression

Tumino 1 [Stephen, Prof English at Pitt, ““What is Orthodox Marxism and Why it Matters Now More than Ever”, Red Critique, p. online]

Orthodox Marxism has become a test-case of the "radical" today. Yet, what passes for orthodoxy on the left—whether like Smith and Zizek they claim to support it, or, like Butler and Rorty they want to "achieve our country" by excluding it from "U.S. Intellectual life" ("On Left Conservatism"), is a parody of orthodoxy which hybridizes its central concepts and renders them into flexodox simulations. Yet, even in its very textuality, however, the orthodox is a resistance to the flexodox. Contrary to the common-sensical view of "orthodox" as "traditional" or "conformist" "opinions," is its other meaning: ortho-doxy not as flexodox "hybridity," but as "original" "ideas." "Original," not in the sense of epistemic "event," "authorial" originality and so forth, but, as in chemistry, in its opposition to "para," "meta," "post" and other ludic hybridities: thus "ortho" as resistance to the annotations that mystify the original ideas of Marxism and hybridize it for the "special interests" of various groups. The "original" ideas of Marxism are inseparable from their effect as "demystification" of ideology—for example the deployment of "class" that allows a demystification of daily life from the haze of consumption. Class is thus an "original idea" of Marxism in the sense that it cuts through the hype of cultural agency under capitalism and reveals how culture and consumption are tied to labor, the everyday determined by the workday: how the amount of time workers spend engaging in surplus-labor determines the amount of time they get for reproducing and cultivating their needs. Without changing this division of labor social change is impossible. Orthodoxy is a rejection of the ideological annotations: hence, on the one hand, the resistance to orthodoxy as "rigid" and "dogmatic" "determinism," and, on the other, its hybridization by the flexodox as the result of which it has become almost impossible today to read the original ideas of Marxism, such as "exploitation"; "surplus-value"; "class"; "class antagonism"; "class struggle"; "revolution"; "science" (i.e., objective knowledge); "ideology" (as "false consciousness"). Yet, it is these ideas alone that clarify the elemental truths through which theory ceases to be a gray activism of tropes, desire and affect, and becomes, instead, a red, revolutionary guide to praxis for a new society freed from exploitation and injustice. Marx's original scientific discovery was his labor theory of value. Marx's labor theory of value is an elemental truth of Orthodox Marxism that is rejected by the flexodox left as the central dogmatism of a "totalitarian" Marxism. It is only Marx's labor theory of value, however, that exposes the mystification of the wages system that disguises exploitation as a "fair exchange" between capital and labor and reveals the truth about this relation as one of exploitation. Only Orthodox Marxism explains how what the workers sell to the capitalist is not labor, a commodity like any other whose price is determined by fluctuations in supply and demand, but their labor-power—their ability to labor in a system which has systematically "freed" them from the means of production so they are forced to work or starve—whose value is determined by the amount of time socially necessary to reproduce it daily. The value of labor-power is equivalent to the value of wages workers consume daily in the form of commodities that keep them alive to be exploited tomorrow. Given the technical composition of production today this amount of time is a slight fraction of the workday the majority of which workers spend producing surplus-value over and above their needs. The surplus-value is what is pocketed by the capitalists in the form of profit when the commodities are sold. Class is the antagonistic division thus established between the exploited and their exploiters. Without Marx's labor theory of value one could only contest the after effects of this outright theft of social labor-power rather than its cause lying in the private ownership of production. The flexodox rejection of the labor theory of value as the "dogmatic" core of a totalitarian Marxism therefore is a not so subtle rejection of the principled defense of the (scientific) knowledge workers need for their emancipation from exploitation because only the labor theory of value exposes the opportunism of knowledges (ideology) that occult this exploitation. Without the labor theory of value socialism would only be a moral dogma that appeals to the sentiments of "fairness" and "equality" for a "just" distribution of the social wealth that does the work of capital by naturalizing the exploitation of labor under capitalism giving it an acceptable "human face."